The Arising of Gender

Buddhist Reflections on Gender and Reality

Posted in: Buddhism, Politics
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Part 1

Orlando’s Idea

The Woman Within

Many years ago, during an interlude on a retreat, I spent an hour or so in friendly conversation with a fellow Buddhist. To protect his privacy, I am going to call him ‘Orlando’ (a loan from Virginia Woolf’s fable of androgyny). Orlando and I had met before, but this was the first time we had spoken at length. He was a pleasant and intelligent conversation partner. Actually, he did nearly all the talking because he was eager to share a problem he was wrestling with. I just listened sympathetically. As I listened, it slowly dawned on me that I was not a privileged confidante. Orlando was on the campaign trail. He was taking every opportunity to get his idea across to members of our sangha—our Buddhist community. I was just the latest to cross his path.

Orlando’s problem was what is now called gender incongruence or gender dysphoria. Putting it less technically, Orlando believed himself to be a woman imprisoned in a man’s body, and this sense of imprisonment caused him distress. In the language of gender theory (about which I will have more to say as we go on), this inner woman was Orlando’s ‘gender identity’. Clearly, she was misaligned with his sex, which means that Orlando was ‘transgendered’.

The existence of transgendered people won’t be news to anyone reading this. Still, it is worth dwelling on the phenomenon for a moment to mull its strangeness and weighty consequences. Orlando believed the core of his identity was feminine and therefore at odds with his male anatomy. Though outwardly a man, he had (or was) a woman within. She was a gendered self, intrinsic to Orlando’s being and therefore inviolable. From this premise flowed two logical conclusions, both of which Orlando had enthusiastically embraced. The first was that his body was an error requiring correction. He was so convinced of the error that he was contemplating a very drastic correction, namely medical transition. He believed that hormones and surgery would liberate him from the prison of his body, and allow him to be the woman he truly was on the inside.

Orlando’s second conclusion was that, being essentially a woman, he should be in the women’s section of our sangha, not the men’s. This was quite a tall order. The separation of the sexes for the purposes of spiritual practice is traditional in Buddhist societies and it remains relevant today. It isn’t just a matter of avoiding the distraction of sexual desire. The biological differences between men and women are not just physical; they play out as average psychosocial differences, which complicate communication between the sexes. Spiritual friendship—which the Buddha described as ‘the whole of the spiritual life’—flourishes best amongst people of the same sex. In our sangha, the separation of the sexes is far from absolute, but we value it highly in certain contexts, such as retreats, study groups, and residential communities.

The separation is particularly important in the context of ordination. Our ordinations are not monastic (though neither are they ‘lay’ in the traditional sense of the word). However, the processes by which men and women are prepared and selected for ordination are separate from each other. Each process gradually inducts the aspirant into a network of spiritual friendship that will support him or her for a lifetime—and perhaps longer. Orlando’s woman within posed a challenge to all that.

Orlando was one of the pioneers of ‘gender diversity’ in our sangha. His arrival in our midst raised some new and difficult questions. What does it mean to practise the Buddhist virtue of compassion in relation to people like Orlando? Does it mean affirming them in their preferred gender, disregarding their sex, and supporting them absolutely in their pursuit of medical and social transition? If so, does that mean weakening the single-sex principle? Today, many years after my encounter with Orlando, these questions haven’t gone away. Yet they have never been methodically addressed.

Meanwhile, others have followed the trail that Orlando blazed. Like other western Buddhist communities, ours now includes a ‘gender-diverse’ minority. As an individual, everybody in that minority should of course be welcome. But taken together as a minority, they have been accepted more or less on their own terms—the terms of gender theory—with no systematic attempt to bring that theory into relation with the Dharma. Insofar as we have taken a public stance on gender diversity, it has been piecemeal and uncritical (take a look at our main website and search for items on gender). True, in this passivity, we have been no worse, and perhaps a bit better, than other Buddhist groups in the West. In relation to gender diversity, Western Buddhism as a whole has collectively drifted with the contemporary social tide rather than taken its own bearings and steered an independent course.

But there are signs the tide may be turning. In the UK, for example, there have been recent shifts in law and paediatric medicine, reflecting a dawning realisation that justice for transgender people—as currently conceived—may entail injustice for other social groups. Also, in sections of the psychiatric profession, confidence in the benefits of medical transition, never unanimous, is beginning to falter. Against this background, it may be time to stop drifting. We should frankly discuss how to apply our Buddhist principles to the questions arising from gender diversity. If we don’t, the receding tide may leave us stranded on an uncongenial shore. That unwelcome prospect was the spur to my writing these articles. I hope they help rouse the debate we have avoided for too long.

Before continuing, I’d better face up to the problem of pronouns. No doubt you have noticed I am using he/him/his to refer to Orlando. According to gender theory, this lays me open to the charge of ‘misgendering’ a trans person. Rather than reply to that charge now, I offer this whole series of articles as my answer. For the moment, I will only add that Orlando was still presenting as a man at the time of our conversation, which in fact took place on a men’s retreat. To speak of ‘she’ at this point would be confusing and—it seems to me—straying too far from truth. I am willing to switch to Orlanda (with a final ‘a’) and she/her when referring to the same person after transition. I must add, however, that I regard this flexibility as a personal courtesy, not a moral duty.

Despite my sympathy for Orlando, I doubted his claim to have (or to be) a woman within, even as he explained it in gentle, persuasive tones. My doubts were partly a matter of common sense: a man’s desire to be a woman is not the same as actually being one. They were also a matter of science: I understood, and still understand, sex as a fact of biology. True, sex also has mental and even spiritual ramifications, and they are important. They impinge on ordinary social life, and in Buddhism they underpin the single-sex principle, as I have explained. Nevertheless, sex is at root the binary division of our species into male and female. Of course, we should reject outdated and overly restrictive conceptions of masculinity and femininity. But this doesn’t mean that masculinity and femininity are nothing more than oppressive social constructs. Still less does it mean that sex itself is a matter of personal choice.

Nowadays, the simple fact of the ‘twoness’ of sex has somehow become controversial, so I suppose I will have to defend it. But that would take up too much space at this stage. This article is only mapping the ground for a longer exploration, so I will postpone the defence. Rather than repeat the same promise for every controversial point I make—and there will be many—I simply invite you to be patient and keep reading the series.

Identity or Samskara?

Going beyond common sense and science, my doubts about Orlando’s woman within were also specifically Buddhist in nature. A belief in a gendered self, or indeed any kind of fixed self, does not fit very well with the teaching of non-self—a core concept of Buddhism.1 Orlando didn’t use the word ‘self’, but he clearly regarded the woman within as a fixture and therefore (let me repeat) as intrinsic and inviolable. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have been contemplating the extraordinary bodily trauma and social dislocation of transition.

While I doubted Orlando’s claims, I never doubted his sincerity or the reality of his suffering. Nor have I ever doubted that a genuine problem, an inner conflict of some kind, lay obscurely at the root of that suffering. What I doubted was his interpretation of the conflict—his belief in the woman within. I now know that he hadn’t thought up this interpretation all by himself. He had absorbed it from gender theory.

What I am calling ‘gender theory’ is not monolithic. It has several strands, which may not always be neatly entwined with one another. However, all the strands converge in the claim that a transgender identity is not a delusion but precisely an identity. (Recent versions of the theory also recognise ‘non-binary’ gender identities.) In the context of the theory, the word ‘identity’ suggests a modality of personal existence, a distinct but natural way of being human. Each of us has a gender identity, the theory insists. If your gender identity is aligned with your biological sex, you are ‘cisgender’. While being cisgender is more common, it is not therefore better or healthier than being transgender or non-binary. Such diverse identities can be compared to having red hair or green eyes—forms of natural variability that, despite being minority traits, cannot be condemned as abnormal or unnatural. This, in brief, is why gender theory regards a transgender identity as intrinsic and inviolable.

Such ideas were already current at the time I met Orlando. For example, the pamphlet Transgender Liberation, making more or less this claim, had been in circulation among activists since 1992. Also, going back to the 1980s, there had been places (at least in large cities) where Orlando might have met fellow sufferers of gender dysphoria, and exchanged ideas and experiences: cross-dressing clubs, support groups, and so on.

Orlando must have drawn his notion of the woman within from this background, but he didn’t speak at all about the source of his idea. He preferred to present the woman within as a fact of his experience—a key word, as I’ll explain in a moment. For example, he said he was troubled by a ghostly sense of a female form superimposed on his body. Like an amputee haunted by a phantom limb, he claimed to feel female breasts that should have been there, yet were frustratingly absent. This sounded impressive, hinting at the presence of a female etheric double—if that is the right term—wrongly housed in male flesh.

Presented as ‘experience’, this claim was difficult to argue with, and I didn’t try. Yet its true significance is debatable. A fantasy about having female breasts might be the product of a male paraphilia (an atypical but intense sexual desire) rather than a female gendered self. There are men who have precisely that paraphilia, and there is evidence it plays a part in many cases of gender dysphoria.2 But let’s suppose I’m wrong: that men can indeed have female etheric bodies, or women male ones. Even so, we would have to ask: why regard the etheric body as more real or important than the physical one? Why injure the flesh—with hormones and surgery—to appease the phantom?

What puzzled me most was that Orlando didn’t seem to see any inconsistency between, on the one hand, his belief in the woman within and, on the other, the Buddhist teachings concerning non-self and the fluid nature of mind. In Buddhist terms, it would have made more sense for Orlando to view the woman within as a samskara—a habitual pattern of desire, based on perception and feeling.3 Each of us is, in a sense, the sum total of our samskaras, with no abiding self—gendered or otherwise—hiding behind them.

As a samskara, how might Orlando’s woman within have arisen? At some point in his life, Orlando must have begun to find that the perception of himself as a man produced an unpleasant feeling, and the idea of being a woman a correspondingly pleasant one (this idea being a mental ‘perception’).4 Buddhism doesn’t tell us why such atypical ideas and feelings might arise in a particular case, other than that they might be a result of karma, if only indirectly and in part. From the viewpoint of modern medicine, the feelings could arise for a variety of reasons. They might result from early trauma. They might even have some physical basis, but even so, that would not make the perceptions accurate or beneficial, or establish them as a natural identity.

By receiving persistent but unwise attention, such feelings and perceptions can grow, ramify, and reinforce one another.5 Over time, this process might have produced in Orlando the desire to change his body in order to eliminate the unpleasant feelings and give secure access to the pleasant ones.6 Had Orlando lived in an earlier era, this desire would have been recognisable as a fantasy impossible of fulfilment, and eventually been put aside, or kept at the margins of an otherwise ordinary existence. Unfortunately, he was living in the era of gender theory and gender medicine. These conditions had persuaded him that the fantasy could become reality.

The formation of a samskara, as I have just described it, is partly an emotional process, but it also has a cognitive side. Any samskara must include views. The views arise out of perception—the point at which we categorise the raw impressions of our senses and then attach conceptual labels to them. (This is a profound insight of Buddhism, and Western philosophy has only caught up with it in the last few centuries.) Our minds can elaborate those simple conceptual labels into complex patterns. From the seed of a concept, a view may grow. (Of course, most of us don’t fabricate our own views from scratch; we just pick up and adapt views circulating in our culture.) Views can become whole belief systems through which we interpret the world, such as religions, scientific theories and political ideologies. Gender theory, the source of Orlando’s idea, is one such system among many.

This human ability to elaborate conceptual schemes is both a blessing and a curse. It allows us, on the one hand, to build sophisticated civilisations, and on the other hand to get entangled in erroneous views that lead us into confusion and harm. In our unenlightened state, we not only crave pleasant feelings, we also grasp at views that justify our craving. Among such views there is one type that each of us clings to very tightly, namely ‘self-view’—a particular conception of oneself as such and such.7 Seen in the framework of Buddhist psychology, Orlando’s woman within could only be a self-view, albeit an unusual one. She could not be a gendered self.

The Mystique of Experience

I won’t pretend that, during my conversation with Orlando, I thought all this out as neatly as I have just explained it, yet I did think it in a sketchy sort of way. What I did not do was express my thoughts to Orlando. Why not? Mostly, I think, because I felt I ought not to deny his experience. Orlando and I were immersed in a culture that prized experience. Like many others in our sangha, we were both baby boomers, shaped by the counterculture of the 1960s. We embraced personal authenticity as a value, and this influenced the way we interpreted Buddhism.

As we saw it, authenticity consisted in being true to our experience. That meant valuing knowledge gained at first hand, and distrusting whatever our parents, our schools, and the ‘establishment’ had taught us. In this way, the very word ‘experience’ had acquired a mystique for our generation. Of all the possible varieties of experience, we were particularly fascinated by inner experience. We sought it in ways that included Jungian psychology, psychedelic drugs, and meditation. As a Buddhist, Orlando was of course a practitioner of meditation and mindfulness, and he clearly viewed his knowledge of the woman within as the culmination of an inward voyage of discovery.

The premium we put on experience was reinforced by a rather special conception of mindfulness. In an influential talk in 1970, our teacher, Sangharakshita, had warned us against ‘alienated awareness’, by which he meant ‘awareness without experience’. Such alienation, he suggested, grew partly from the social repression of bodily sensations, feelings and emotions, and partly from an inability to ‘think our own thoughts’. Alienated awareness was a particular problem for Buddhists because they might end up practising mindfulness in an excessively cold and detached way, producing an interior split rather than the inner harmony needed for spiritual development. Sangharakshita’s solution to this problem was, ‘We have to allow ourselves to experience ourselves.’ In Orlando’s eyes, this instruction may have looked like a Buddhist licence for the woman within.8

But in urging us to experience ourselves Sangharakshita meant only that we should bring a kindly awareness, rather than a cold, hostile scrutiny, to our feelings and desires. Kindly awareness of feelings and desires isn’t the same thing as acting them out, or elevating them to the status of an identity. Likewise, in telling us to think for ourselves, Sangharakshita was not recommending that we discard old views merely to embrace new ones, such as gender theory, uncritically.

In fact, Sangharakshita’s critique of alienated awareness was not the last thing that he had to say on the subject of experience. In another talk five years later, he warned us not to think of Buddhist practice exclusively in terms of experience, but rather as a patient process of growth, fostered by work and duty. 9 But perhaps that part of his message was less digestible. In Orlando’s wake, present-day western Buddhists continue to invoke the primacy of ‘experience’ to rebuff analytical scrutiny of the idea of the gendered self.

An Orthodox Delusion

If I had voiced my Buddhist doubts about the woman within, I am sure Orlando would have had something thoughtful to say in reply. He was intelligent and well acquainted with the Dharma, so he must have been troubled by similar doubts at some point, or heard a similar critique from other Buddhists. In response, I think he would have argued, as some transgender Buddhists currently do, that even if the woman within could not strictly speaking be a self, she might nevertheless be persistent enough to require expression and acknowledgement. Until enlightenment is attained—which is probably a long way off for most of us—we are all more or less attached to some kind of self-view. The woman within might only be a mental construct, but so are all self-views. And if there is no self, all self-views—not just Orlando’s—are deluded. Does it matter then if some people are attached to a cross-gendered self-view? Rather than make life difficult for them, wouldn’t it be kinder if the rest of us made room for more variety of self-view?

I understand why some western Buddhists, anxious to manifest kindness visibly, are swayed by this sort of argument. And it is probably true that, in some cases, gender dysphoria is such a strong force, so intractable, that it requires some expression and acknowledgement—some measure of ‘acting out’ in everyday life. But in that case, the task is to define the parameters of acceptable expression. How much freedom of gender expression can any transgender person reasonably demand from society? And how much freedom can a Buddhist transwoman, such as Orlando, reasonably expect within the sangha? I won’t attempt to answer these questions yet, but I suggest that the answers must take account of two things. Firstly, however strong it might be, gender dysphoria is the product of a samskara, and not an inviolable core of identity. Secondly, medical and social transition are bound to have an impact not only on those who actually undergo them, but on other people too. The wellbeing of all, not just one or a few, must be regarded.

Buddhism does indeed teach that all self-views are deluded in an ultimate sense, but this does not mean that all delusions are equal. Some delusions are more delusory than others, and can lead to worse consequences, both for the deluded individuals and those around them. Medical transition involves irreversible changes to a healthy body, destroying functions, producing a lifelong dependence on pharmaceuticals, and often leading to medical complications. All this is done to achieve benefits for which convincing evidence remains elusive. Social transition can also produce undesirable consequences, damaging relationships and creating conflicts over rights between the gender-diverse minority and other social groups.

Of all this, I will have more to say in further articles in this series. But right now, I had better defend that word ‘delusion’. I know it will seem offensive to those like Orlando, who see knowledge of their gender as hard-won wisdom. I mean no offence, and I am not being careless with words. I am using ‘delusion’ in the broad sense of ‘a false or mistaken belief’. Obviously, the belief in a gendered self is not a delusion in the psychiatric sense: it isn’t a psychotic delusion. That could hardly be the case with an idea that has actually become quite normal in society nowadays.

True, most of us don’t believe that we were born in the wrong body, but many of us believe that certain people are so born. We—the general public—have come to accept the existence of the gendered self. We accept it because an apparently authoritative body of experts— philosophers, psychiatrists, human rights lawyers and even some biologists—has taught us to believe in it. These experts, together with cadres of activists in human rights organisations and political parties, constitute what I am going to call the gender lobby. Over the last few decades, the gender lobby has succeeded in establishing gender theory as a new orthodoxy. To an astonishing degree, Orlando’s idea has become deeply entrenched in medicine, law and education. Much of the general public fails to grasp how powerful that orthodoxy has become.

Yet despite its current status as an orthodoxy, the belief in gender identity, as conceived by contemporary gender theory, is indeed a delusion. I assert this not just because of its incoherence, lack of a scientific basis, and incompatibility with Buddhist teachings. It must also be deemed mistaken because of the dire consequences it can have for those who persist in it, for their families, and for society as a whole. For the moment, I will only say that, in the last decade or two, considerable harm has been done by the orthodoxy, perhaps most of all to children by the advance of so-called paediatric gender medicine, and to the rights of the parents of those children. The orthodoxy has also undermined the sex-based rights of women, posing threats to their safety and privacy. Gays and lesbians have suffered too.

Of course, most transgender people mean no harm, and I am not blaming individuals like Orlando for all these troubles. Many of them just want to get on with their lives, and are grateful for whatever acceptance they receive from kindly friends, family members and workmates. They don’t become vociferous advocates for transitioning children, or for invading women’s spaces. Still, the fact that most transwomen and transmen are, as individuals, innocent of any bad intention should not prevent us from looking critically at the gender orthodoxy itself and the mischief that it brings about.

It is because of that mischief that, after much searching, I cannot find a word better than ‘delusion’ for the belief in a gendered self. But the belief is only the conceptual aspect of the samskara. Just as we need a word for that aspect, we need another word for the emotional-volitional aspect—the energy that galvanises the belief into action, driving Orlando and his kind to undergo pharmaceutical and surgical trauma, and to insist that everyone honour their delusion. For this aspect, I suggest the best word available in common use is ‘obsession’. My dictionary defines ‘obsession’ as ‘a persistent idea or impulse that continually forces its way into consciousness’. Thus, an obsession is not just an idea but an impulse—a spur to action.

In common English usage, it therefore seems fair to call the belief in the gendered self a delusion, and the quest to enact that delusion an obsession. But neither of these words is quite right for the purpose of a psychiatric analysis. A better term would be ‘overvalued idea’ or ‘extreme overvalued belief’. This is an important psychiatric concept. It will provide a key to get us out of the prison in which gender theory has trapped us.

The Charge of Transphobia

My meeting with Orlando sticks in my memory for several reasons. For one thing, it was the first time I had actually met a transgender individual of any kind, let alone a Buddhist one. To hear the case for transgenderism argued at first hand by a true believer was impressive and thought-provoking. It even succeeded in convincing me for a while, making me bury my doubts and transforming me into a quasi-ally of the transgender cause for many years.

But, more important than his skilled advocacy, I remember Orlando as very likeable: warm, gentle, thoughtful and sincere. His positive qualities made me want to support him in his quest for happiness. But even as he put his case to me, I felt an anxious misgiving—a worry on his behalf—about his plan to undergo transition. Obviously, this was linked to my unspoken doubts about his idea, but it was not just an intellectual disagreement. It was a sympathetic concern for his wellbeing. I feared that if he went ahead with transition, he would damage his body and disrupt his relationships, but not make any lasting gain in inner peace.

At the back of my mind perhaps was an awareness of all the people who do mischief to themselves out of confusion: drug addicts, anorexics, self-harmers, and so on. Outside their compulsion, they may be good and likeable people. Some can even rationalise their self-destructive behaviour articulately. Anorexics may actually misperceive their body size. Some of them truly believe they are fat. What if Orlando were a similar case: a good man in the grip of an obsession (or rather, as I have said, an ‘overvalued idea’)? Perhaps there are occasions when compassion consists precisely in not affirming someone—or rather, not affirming their idea.

That is the nub of it: what I am challenging is Orlando’s idea, not Orlando himself. I have to stress this because, as I have said, gender theory has become an orthodoxy, holding sway over medicine, law and education. Indeed, more than an orthodoxy, it is held with quasi-religious fervour by many advocates, including some Buddhists. Among them are a few in my own sangha. For example, one of us has gone on record with the following extraordinary pronouncement: ‘Enforcing binary gender onto any society has been one of the world’s worst atrocities. It should be considered a human rights violation.’ 10

One of the world’s worst atrocities? On a par, therefore, with the Holocaust or Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’, both of which extinguished millions of lives? Can we be talking about the idea that there are just two sexes? Hasn’t that been accepted as an obvious fact through the ages by people everywhere?11 Isn’t the public recognition of that fact—in custom and in law—appropriate and indeed necessary? (I don’t deny some customs and laws are better than others.) If yes to all the above, then how can it be an ‘atrocity’? And how can a Buddhist use that word without drawing a murmur of gentle disagreement from other Buddhists? That fact is, I am sad to say, a measure of our dire collective confusion on the topic of ‘gender’. And of course, it isn’t difficult to guess what the speaker would think of this article, or what action she would wish to see taken over it.

True, most Buddhists in the gender lobby adopt a less militant tone. They argue for gender diversity in terms of compassion rather than justice. But to all such advocates and allies, Buddhist or not, my scepticism about gender theory will appear as ‘transphobia’—a ‘cis-normative’ desire to ‘erase’ trans people. In my defence, I am pointing out that my response to Orlando as a person was positive, even protective.

But the misgivings that flitted through my mind as I listened to him, though not expressed and subsequently buried, have returned in force. I no longer believe that Orlando—or anyone else—has a ‘gender identity’ misaligned with their sex. Or at least, I no longer believe it in the uncritical sense that Orlando did: the idea of a gendered self, intrinsic and inviolable. Because I am sceptical of the idea of a gendered self, I must also be sceptical of the political edifice that has been built on top of it: the whole structure of gender theory with its militant insistence that society honour gender diversity. There must be better ways of expressing compassion towards those who suffer gender incongruence and dysphoria. We need to work out what they are.

The Arising of Gender

Even if I were not a Buddhist, I would be sceptical about the prevailing gender orthodoxy. I think any thoughtful citizen ought to be sceptical of it, especially one who has delved into its history. The task of explaining my scepticism is complex, and my desire to bring Buddhism into the explanation makes it even more complex. That is why this article, despite its length, can do no more than sketch-map the territory to be covered. I have raised some difficult questions, and I will raise more as I go on. They include, for example, the questions of what biology has to say about sex (is it a spectrum or a binary division?); whether gender theory has really become an orthodoxy, and if so, how that came about; what the real cause of gender dysphoria might be, if not the presence of a gendered self; and many more.

I want to explore these questions as both a concerned citizen and a Buddhist. For my purpose, the perfect framework is provided by the teaching of Dependent Arising. Like the teaching of non-self, this is a core doctrine of Buddhism. The Buddha taught that all things arise and cease in dependence upon conditions. This should be well understood by Buddhists, whom I suppose to be the majority of my readers, so I won’t expound it in detail.

Dependent Arising is a philosophy that seeks to make sense of human experience by relating causes and conditions to resulting effects. To that extent, it is a philosophy that can accommodate the findings of empirical science. True, Buddhism focusses on the mind as a causal agent, whereas science, for the most part, acknowledges only material causes. Nevertheless, there is some congruence between the two in that they both look for intelligible causal relationships. In particular, insights from psychiatry or clinical psychology may be compatible with Buddhism: they both recognise that mental suffering may be relieved by learning to attend to our experience in new ways. Last but not least, Dependent Arising challenges the idea of an abiding self. And a self that does not exist cannot have a gender.

In accordance with the framework of Dependent Arising, I can now absorb all my controversial questions into three main areas of enquiry:

  • Firstly, in dependence upon what conditions does gender dysphoria arise, whether in Orlando or in any other trans-identified person? In this question, ‘gender’ signifies a psychological phenomenon in the life of an individual. Once we know how gender dysphoria arises, we will be better placed to judge whether it reveals the existence of a gendered self or just a variety of disordered mental states.
  • Secondly, in dependence upon what conditions did it become, in our society, a human right to realign the whole of one’s identity (body, name, pronouns, dress habits, birth certificate, and whatever else) with one’s misaligned gender? In this question, ‘gender’ points to a cultural phenomenon—a novel way of thinking and talking about identity that has taken shape in western society over the course of (roughly speaking) the last seven decades. This way of thinking is what I mean by ‘gender theory’. Once we know how the theory arose and became an orthodoxy, we will be better placed to judge whether it has been a triumph for human freedom or human folly.
  • From these two fundamental questions a third emerges: what social consequences have arisen in dependence on society’s granting to the gendered self the status of a human right? Are those consequences, on balance, beneficial or harmful? This will include an examination of two things. One is the impact of the gender orthodoxy on various social groups, such as children (via so-called paediatric gender medicine), women, gays and lesbians. The other is the question of whether transition actually benefits those who undergo it. Within this broader social picture, I also want to investigate the consequences of gender theory for the practice of Buddhism.

To investigate all these areas, I will need to draw extensively on secular knowledge—facts and ideas from disciplines such as psychiatry, philosophy, biology, and sociology. However, I will try to keep the argument within the framework of Dependent Arising. Hence my overall title for the series: ‘The Arising of Gender’.

A Happy Ending?

Before I close, you may be curious to know what became of Orlando. Did he ‘desist’? In other words, did he relinquish his plan to transition? The vast majority of sufferers from gender dysphoria do indeed desist. At least, they used to do so until gender theory became an orthodoxy promoted by medicine, law and education. Alternatively, did Orlando persist with transition, and become Orlanda? Was Orlanda (thenceforward she/her) accepted into the women’s section of our sangha? How did that work out?

Interesting questions, but—sorry to disappoint you—I am not going to answer them directly. For one thing, Orlanda, if she has indeed replaced Orlando, would probably be reluctant to answer the questions of a sceptic like me. Also, her companions in the women’s sangha might hesitate to speak their minds freely for a variety of reasons. They might be inhibited by the orthodoxy I’ve mentioned, and by a widespread tendency to equate compassion with the political value of ‘inclusion’. For these reasons, and for the sake of ordinary tact and delicacy, I am not going to track down Orlanda and pester her with personal questions. Instead, I will assume that she—and her friends in the women’s sangha—would confirm her transition as a success, triumphantly refuting my scepticism.

But such assurances, however sincere, may not be reliable. As a methodology for investigating the success of a medical treatment, self-report has well-known drawbacks. Also, when we enquire whether transition really benefits those who undergo it, we find that much depends on how we define ‘benefit’. It is too narrow to ask whether transition ameliorates gender dysphoria. Rather, we must pose a much broader question: on average, do the psychosocial benefits of transition, such as they are, justify the price that must be paid for them? By ‘price’ I mean not just the financial cost (substantial though that is), but the overall impact on the individual’s long-term physical and mental health, relationships, and integration into society. I will look for an answer in the next article.

Footnotes

  1. ‘Non-self’ – Sanskrit: anatman; Pali: anatta.
  2. Since the time of my meeting with Orlando, psychiatry has begun to recognise a paraphilia called autogynephilia. This refers to heterosexual men who become aroused by the thought of having female bodily parts.
  3. Unlike most of the Buddhist terminology that I use in this article, I leave saṃskāra untranslated because it is a complex idea with no crisp English equivalent.
  4. ‘Perception’ – Sanskrit: saṃjñā. ‘Feeling’ – Sanskrit: vedanā.
  5. ‘Unwise attention’ – Sanskrit: ayoniso manasikara.
  6. What I call ‘desire’ can be correlated with various Pali or Sanskrit terms referring to volitional states, depending on which specific formulation of mental activity is involved. In the context of the twelve links (Pali: paticca samuppada), feeling arises from sense contact (Pali: phassa), and in turn gives rise to craving (Pali: taṇhā). In the context of the five skandhas, feeling and perception give rise to the mental formations (Pali: saṅkhāra; Sanskrit: samskara), which represent the volitional and karmic element of mental activity. In the context of the ‘omnipresent mental events’ of the Sarvastivadin Abhidhamma, feeling and perception give rise to volition (Sanskrit: cetanā).
  7. ‘Self-view’ – Sanskrit: satkāya-dṛṣṭi
  8. Sangharakshita, From Alienated Awareness to Integrated Awareness, audio recording and transcript available at From Alienated Awareness to Integrated Awareness | Text | free buddhist audio. The talk is also included in edited form in Sangharakshita, Complete Works, Vol. 12, A New Buddhist Movement II.
  9. Sangharakshita, Enlightenment as Experience and as Non-Experience, audio and transcript available at Enlightenment as Experience and as Non-Experience by Sangharakshita | free buddhist audio.
  10. Vimalasara (Valerie) Mason-John, in Transcending: Trans Buddhist Voices, ed. Kevin Manders and Elizabeth Marston, North Atlantic Books, Berkeley, California (2019). The comment appears in the section titled, ‘Praise for Transcending’, which prefaces the book.
  11. I know that gender theory claims there are various cultures where the existence of multiple genders is recognised, e.g. ‘two-spirit’ people among native American tribes, the Faʻafāfine in Samoa, and others. I intend to evaluate this claim later in the series.
Subhamati[1]

Subhamati has been a member of Triratna Buddhist Order for thirty-one years. He has led a varied career as a university administrator, a language teacher, and a teacher of meditation and Buddhism. He has worked as an editor or co-author (with Dharmachari Subhuti) on several books, including Buddhism and Friendship and Mind in Harmony: the psychology of Buddhist ethics.

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